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Objective. To examine the effect of the recession on the financial performance of
safety-net versus non-safety-net hospitals.
Data Sources/Study Setting. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Hospital
Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases, Medicare Cost Reports, Ameri-
can Hospital Association Annual Survey, InterStudy, and Area Health Resource File.
Study Design. Retrospective, longitudinal panel of hospitals, 2007–2011. Safety-net
hospitals were identified using percentage of patients who wereMedicaid or uninsured.
Generalized estimating equations were used to estimate average effects of the recession
on hospital operating and total margins, revenues and expenses in each year, 2008–
2011, comparing safety-net with non-safety-net hospitals.
Data Collection/Extraction Methods. 1,453 urban, nonfederal, general acute hos-
pitals in 32 states with complete data.
Principal Findings. Safety-net hospitals, as identified in 2007, had lower operating
and total margins. The gap in operating margin between safety-net and non-safety-net
hospitals was sustained throughout the recession; however, total margin was more neg-
atively affected for non-safety-net hospitals in 2008. Higher percentages of Medicaid
and uninsured patients were associated with lower revenue in private hospitals in all
years, and lower revenue and expenses in public hospitals in 2011.
Conclusions. Safety-net hospitals may not be disproportionately vulnerable to
macro-economic fluctuations, but their significantly lower margins leave less financial
cushion to weather sustained financial pressure.
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In the U.S. health care system, where many patients are uninsured or underin-
sured, safety-net hospitals play a critical role in providing access to care
(Gaskin and Hadley 1999; Hadley and Cunningham 2004). Safety-net
hospitals—primarily public and private, not-for-profit hospitals—are
defined as having both of the following characteristics: (1) a mandate or
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mission to provide care to all patients, regardless of ability to pay, and (2) a
substantial proportion of patients who are uninsured, Medicaid-enrolled, or
otherwise vulnerable (Institute of Medicine 2000). Vulnerable patients seek
access to primary care in safety-net hospital emergency departments and
outpatient clinics (Felland, Hurley, and Kemper 2008). Safety-net hospitals
are also more likely to provide certain high-cost, low-margin specialty
services such as trauma care, burn care, psychiatric care, and pediatric or
neonatal intensive care that benefit not only vulnerable populations but also
whole communities (Gaskin 1999).
Because of their role in providing widespread access, safety-net hospi-
tals’ financial viability has been an ongoing concern (Institute of Medicine
2000). Previous studies have shown mixed results regarding the effect of mar-
ket and policy variables on safety-net hospitals’ financial performance; how-
ever, studies agree that safety-net hospitals, on average, have lower baseline
levels of financial performance as compared to non-safety-net hospitals. Using
two definitions of safety-net status (expense burden and market share),
Zuckerman et al. (2001) classified all urban, nonfederal, short-term general
hospitals into four mutually exclusive groups using 1990 data on bad debt and
charity care. Descriptive analysis showed that growing managed care penetra-
tion and declining reimbursement from 1990 to 1997 led to greater declines in
total margins for safety-net hospitals than for non-safety-net hospitals, despite
growth in revenue during the same period. In a follow-up study, Bazzoli et al.
(2005) found, similarly, that despite reversals in some of the plannedMedicare
and Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment cuts
proposed under the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA), hospitals providing the
greatest amounts of uncompensated care showed no improvement in total
margins between 1996 and 2002.
In contrast, a study of 2,300 hospitals in 1995 found no disproportionate
effects of managed care on the financial performance of public hospitals rela-
tive to private hospitals (Clement and Grazier 2001). Similarly, a longitudinal
study of acute care hospitals from 1990 to 1999 showed that over time, safety-
net status was not associated with disproportionate changes in total margin rel-
ative to other hospitals. The authors did, however, find that hospitals serving
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lower socioeconomic status patients (SES) and greater shares of Medicaid
patients had lower total profit margins overall and may have reduced operat-
ing expenditures over time (Zwanziger, Khan, and Bamezai 2010).
While safety-net hospitals have been shown to survive difficult market
and policy environments, studies have suggested that this is a result of both the
availability of subsidies and deliberate actions on the part of safety-net provid-
ers. Bazzoli et al. (2006) found that, as financial pressures mounted following
the BBA, core and voluntary safety-net hospitals reduced uncompensated care.
In contrast, Felland et al. (2003) found that, in nine of twelve communities that
were part of the Community Tracking Study, the capacity and viability of
safety-net providers strengthened over the period 1996–2001. The strengthen-
ing was achieved through strategies such as integration, eliminating ineffi-
ciency, and attracting insured patients. Access to DSH funds, state or local
charity subsidies, and tobacco settlement or tax dollars also helped bolster the
strength of the safety-net in these communities (Felland et al. 2003). More
recently, the Community Tracking Study found that as demand for safety-net
services increased, hospitals were employing strategies more commonly found
among private hospitals. For example, safety-net hospitals were upgrading
facilities, growing more profitable services, and attracting patients with more
generous insurance coverage (Cunningham, Bazzoli, and Katz 2008).
Although previous studies have demonstrated the ability of safety-net
hospitals to make strategic and operational changes in response to policy or
market pressures, the great recession that began in late December 2007 and
persisted through June 2009 (NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee 2011)
may have challenged the financial viability of safety-net hospitals across the
nation. The purpose of this study was to examine how safety-net hospitals
fared financially compared with other hospitals during the recession.
Conceptual Framework
Previous studies have shown that determinants of hospital profitability gener-
ally fall into four broad categories: (1) organizational characteristics, such as
teaching status, size, or ownership; (2) managerial decisions, such as financing
or service mix; (3) patient mix measures, such as Medicaid, uncompensated
care, or case mix; and (4) market characteristics, such as area income levels or
hospital competition (Gapenski, Vogel, and Langland-Orban 1993; Gautam,
Campbell, and Arrington 1996; Younis, Rice, and Barkoulas 2001).
Among these factors, there are several attributes unique to safety-net
hospitals that may contribute to their financial vulnerability. First, safety-net
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hospitals serve a high percentage ofMedicaid patients, andMedicaid payment
rates are mostly lower than those of Medicare and private insurance. If the
payment rate is inadequate to cover the costs of providing services to Medic-
aid patients, revenue shortfalls occur. Second, the level of uncompensated
care, which includes both charity care (i.e., services provided to the uninsured)
and bad debt, tends to be higher in safety-net hospitals than in other hospitals.
If the costs of these services cannot be covered by other sources of revenue,
the hospital’s financial viability can be in jeopardy. Finally, safety-net hospitals
are heavily reliant on federal, state, and local government subsidies to cover
the costs of care provided to indigent populations. Reductions in these funding
sources can significantly erode the revenue base of a safety-net hospital.
The recession may have affected all these factors and led to lower overall
financial performance in safety-net hospitals. First, the recession may have
affected patient mix. Increases in unemployment during the recession led to
loss of private insurance coverage, especially among higher-income popula-
tions (Cawley, Moriya, and Simon 2013). This loss of private insurance may
have limited safety-net hospitals’ ability to target patients with more generous
insurance coverage; a strategy they had been pursuing prior to the start of the
recession (Cunningham, Bazzoli, and Katz 2008). At the same time private
insurance was declining, Medicaid enrollments grew (Gordon 2012). For
many safety-net hospitals, particularly those that are publicly owned, Medic-
aid accounts for 25 to over 50 percent of the hospital’s revenue (Bachrach,
Braslow, and Karl 2012). While growth in Medicaid has the potential to
increase available reimbursement, it also gives patients options to seek care at
non-safety-net providers (Gaskin, Hadley, and Freeman 2001). The concur-
rent loss of private insurance coverage and increase in Medicaid likely had
complex, possibly competing effects on safety-net hospitals; however, on
average, it has been shown that demand for safety-net services grew during
the recession and much of the growth was among the uninsured (Felland et al.
2010). This led to our first hypothesis:
H1: During the recession, operating margin declined more for safety-net hospitals
than for non-safety-net hospitals.
In addition, for state and local governments across the nation, the eco-
nomic downturn resulted in significant declines in income and property taxes
(Gordon 2012). This drop in revenue strained state and local budgets,
and therefore the ability of governments to provide financial support to
the safety-net. In 2004, prior to the recession, supplemental payments to
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safety-net hospitals had begun to increase, raising once negative operating
margins to a positive 5 percent on average by 2007 (National Association of
Public Hospitals and Health Systems 2011b). A recent study by Kane et al.
(2012) underscored the importance of state and local government subsidies to
the financial health of safety-net hospitals. Within the most competitive hospi-
tal markets, the authors found higher operating and total margins among
safety-net hospitals governed directly by elected officials, simply because these
hospitals were in better positions to obtain tax and DSH subsidies (Kane et al.
2012). If the recession eroded these subsidies, then we would expect the finan-
cial performance of safety-net hospitals to decline more than in other hospitals.
Felland et al. (2010) found that in five metropolitan communities, fed-
eral stimulus aid provided as part of the February 2009 American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act helped offset the effects of state and local budget
shortfalls; however, in most cases these funds did not directly flow to
safety-net hospitals. Rather, these funds kept safety-net hospitals from feel-
ing the effects of even greater state budget cuts (Felland et al. 2010). As total
margin includes all sources of revenue, including subsidies, the effects of
the recession on subsidies should be evident in total margin. This led to our
second hypothesis:
H2: During the recession, total margin declined more for safety-net hospitals than
for non-safety-net hospitals.
To test our hypotheses, our primary analysis modeled hospital financial
performance as a function of characteristics and factors known to be associ-
ated with hospital profitability, and included a dummy variable for each year
of the recession. To examine differences between safety-net and non-safety-
net hospitals, we identified hospitals as safety-net providers using discharge
data from 2007 and interacted “safety-net status” in 2007 with each year of the
recession.
While the effect of being a safety-net hospital just prior to the recession
was of primary interest, previous studies have shown that there is no single
way to define safety-net hospitals. Moreover, the unique characteristics of
safety-net hospitals suggest the possibility for nuanced effects of the recession
based on the actual volume or “exposure” of hospitals to uninsured and
Medicaid patients over time. To identify differential effects of the recession
based on any variations in safety-net activities over time, we conducted a sec-
ondary analysis in which we interacted a continuous measure of the annual
percentage of Medicaid and uninsured patients in each hospital (“safety-net
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Data on hospital utilization and payer were drawn from the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
(HCUP) State Inpatient Databases (SID). These data were combined with
hospital financial data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Medicare Cost Report, and hospital characteristics from the American Hospi-
tal Association Annual Survey. Data on HMO penetration in 2006 came from
InterStudy. Finally, market characteristics were obtained from the Area
Health Resource File.
The study sample consisted of a balanced panel of urban, nonfederal,
general acute care hospitals in 32 states with complete data over the period
of 2007–2011. Urban location included metropolitan and micropolitan
areas in accordance with the latest definition of Core Based Statistical Area
(CBSA) (Office of Management and Budget 2013). Critical access hospitals
and hospitals with 25 beds or less were excluded, as were hospitals that did
not operate continuously throughout the 5-year study period. Finally, hos-
pitals with multiple-to-one matches between the SID and the Medicare
Cost Report were excluded. These were hospitals that were reported as
individual entities in the SID, but consolidated into a single, larger entity
in the Medicare Cost Report (for example, at the system level). The final
study sample included 7,265 hospital-year observations from 1,453 unique
hospitals.
Financial Performance Measures
We used six hospital financial measures as outcome variables. The first two
were profitability ratios reflecting the ability of the organization to generate
revenue and control expenses. Operating margin was defined as the difference
between operating revenue and operating expenses divided by operating rev-
enue, and measured the profitability of the hospital’s core operating activities
(typically patient care and related activities). Total margin was defined as the
difference between total revenue and total expenses divided by total revenue,
and measured the profitability of all of the hospital’s activities, including the
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effects of financial investments, contributions, and subsidies (McKay and
Gapenski 2009). As operating and total margin are ratios, they were included
untransformed in our analysis.
In addition, we examined the components of these ratios. The remain-
ing four outcome measures included the following: (1) operating revenue,
which included revenue from patient care and other operating activities but
excluded revenue obtained from charitable contributions, investment
income, and other noncore activities; (2) total revenue, which included all
sources of revenue; (3) operating expenses, which reflected expenses
incurred to produce operating revenue; and (4) total expenses. Revenues and
expenses were converted to constant dollars using the GDP Deflator (U.S.
Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014) and were
measured per adjusted patient day, where inpatient days were adjusted to
reflect outpatient activity using the method outlined by the American Hospi-
tal Association (AHA Data Viewer 2014). Revenue and expense values were
log-transformed so that coefficients reflected semi-elasticities (proportional
differences).
Safety-Net Measures
The key explanatory variable in this study was a dummy variable indicating
hospital safety-net status as measured in 2007. There are multiple ways to
quantify the key attributes of safety-net hospitals as defined by the Institute of
Medicine (2000), including Medicaid caseload, uncompensated care burden,
DSH index, and facility characteristics such as public ownership and teaching
status (Zwanziger and Khan 2008; McHugh, Kang, and Hasnain-Wynia
2009). However, many of these measures have limitations. For example,
uncompensated care also includes bad debt from privately insured patients,
which is different from charity care. The DSH index covers only Medicaid
patients and the dual-eligible component of the Medicare population; it does
not capture the uninsured. Finally, facility characteristics like public andmajor
teaching hospitals exclude other hospitals that also share the mission of serv-
ing vulnerable populations.
In this study, we took advantage of the HCUP all-payer data that cap-
tured all discharges from each participating hospital. In our primary analysis,
we identified safety-net versus non-safety-net hospitals (safety-net status) based
on the percentage of total patients who were covered by Medicaid or unin-
sured in 2007. Hospitals falling within the top quartile of the measure in 2007
were classified as safety-net providers throughout the study period. In a
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secondary analysis, in lieu of 2007 safety-net status, we included continuous
annual measures of the percentage of patients covered by Medicaid or unin-
sured (safety-net intensity) for each hospital.
Control Variable Measures
Control variables included hospital and market characteristics. Hospital char-
acteristics included size, as measured by the number of beds; ownership,
including public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit; teaching status,
as measured by major teaching, minor teaching or nonteaching; system affilia-
tion (yes/no); outpatient volume, measured by the number of visits; and
patient severity of illness, where high severity was defined by APR-DRG
severity of illness levels 3 and 4 from the HCUP data.
Market characteristics were measured at the CBSA level. Compared
with a county-level definition, this could mean less variation in hospital con-
centration and managed care penetration. Nevertheless, it has the advantage
of providing a broader market area to capture all potential competitors, and
the distribution of hospital concentration is less skewed. Wong et al. found a
high correlation among hospital competition measures constructed by a num-
ber of different market definitions—fixed geopolitical boundaries (e.g.,
county, MSA), fixed radius, variable radius, and patient flow (Wong, Zhan,
andMutter 2005).
Hospital concentration was measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), computed as the sum of squared market shares of all competing
hospitals within a CBSA. We used hospital discharge counts derived from the
HCUP data to calculate market share that reflected the actual amount of ser-
vices/output provided by each hospital within a CBSA. Managed care pene-
tration was measured as the percentage of the population in the CBSA
enrolled in HMOs. Finally, county-level median household income and
unemployment rate were obtained from the Area Health Resource File and
aggregated to the CBSA level.
Models and Estimation
We employed multivariate analysis to examine the relationship between
safety-net activities and the various measures of hospital financial perfor-
mance during the recession. In our primary analysis, we specified a model
to assess differences between safety-net and nonsafety-net hospitals in
operating and total margins during the 5-year study period, where
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safety-net status was defined in 2007 (the base year). The model was speci-
fied as follows:
yit ¼ b0 þ b1Year t þ b2SN2007 þ b3SN2007 Yeart þ b4Hospitalit
þ b5Marketit þ li þ eit ð1Þ
where yit represents operating or total margin for hospital i in year t.Yeart is a
vector of dummy variables representing each of the study years. SN2007 is a
hospital’s safety-net status in 2007. Hospitalit represents a vector of hospital
characteristics to control for potentially confounding factors. Marketit
reflects a vector of market characteristics. li represents a hospital-specific error
term and eit is the random error. The interaction between a hospital’s safety-
net status in 2007 and year measured the effect of being a safety-net hospital in
each of the study years on the outcome of interest. Baseline differences
between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals were controlled for by the
safety-net indicator in 2007.
In a secondary analysis, we specified a model to measure the yearly





where SNit is a hospital’s safety-net intensity in each year and the yearly effects
of variation in safety-net intensity are captured by the interaction term
between the continuous safety-net intensity variable and year.
For each model, we first examined potential collinearity among the
independent variables. In our estimation of both models 1 and 2, we
dropped hospital size and teaching status due to their high correlation with
safety-net status. In model 1, we excluded ownership for the same reason.
In our estimation of model 2, we included public versus private ownership,
as well as the interaction of ownership with our other control variables. A
number of variables, including outpatient volume, HMO penetration,
unemployment rate, revenues, and expenses were log-transformed. The
residual plot of each model revealed no issues of non-normality or heter-
oskedasticity.
We estimated our models using both random effects and generalized
estimating equations (GEE) to control for correlation of the error terms within
hospitals over time. Both estimation methods produced similar results; thus,
we present results from the GEEmodels.
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RESULTS
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on all study variables averaged over the
period 2007–2011. Statistics are presented for safety-net and non-safety-net
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Study Hospitals, Average over Five Years
(2007–2011)
Safety-Net Hospitals† Non-Safety-Net Hospitals
No. of hospitals (total = 1,453) 364 1,089




Private, not-for-profit 54.1 75.0
Private, for-profit 21.7 16.1
Size (%)
Small (<150 beds) 43.7 39.7***
Medium (150–449) 43.0 51.4
Large (450 andmore) 13.3 9.0
Teaching status (%)
Major teaching 16.4 7.5***
Minor teaching 20.9 26.8
Nonteaching 62.7 65.8
System affiliation (%) 63.4 67.1**
High-severity patients (%) 24.6 28.4***
Outpatient visits (#) 186,532 199,280*
Financial measures
Operatingmargin (%) 2.9 1.1***
Total margin (%) 2.5 4.4***
Operating revenues ($)‡ 2,299.1 2,383.2***
Total revenues ($)‡ 2,452.5 2,517.0*
Operating expenses ($)‡ 2,350.9 2,342.8
Total expenses ($)‡ 2,380.8 2,388.6
Market characteristics
Hospital concentration 0.34 0.31**
HMOpenetration§ (%) 23.7 23.9
Median household income 49,492.3 52,127.6***
Unemployment rate (%) 8.4 7.7***
Note. Significance testing for differences between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals in owner-
ship, size, and teaching status applies to the overall distribution across categories of each character-
istic rather than by each specific category.
†Safety-net hospitals were defined as those that had the percentage of Medicaid and uninsured
patients falling within the top quartile of this measure in 2007.
‡Revenues and expenses were adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator, and measured as per
adjusted patient day.
§Data on HMOpenetration is available only for 1 year, 2006.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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hospitals, where safety-net hospitals are defined as those whose percentage of
total patients that are Medicaid or uninsured falls in the top quartile of all hos-
pitals in the sample in 2007. The average percentage of Medicaid and unin-
sured patients was 42.4 for safety-net hospitals versus 20.4 for non-safety-net
hospitals. Nearly 25 percent of the safety-net hospitals were publicly owned
versus only about 9 percent of the non-safety-net hospitals, and this difference
was statistically significant. More of the safety-net hospitals had fewer than 150
beds or 450 beds and more as compared to non-safety-net hospitals (43.7 per-
cent vs. 39.7 percent, and 13.3 percent vs. 9.0 percent). Also, more of the
safety-net hospitals were major teaching hospitals (16.4 percent vs. 7.5 per-
cent). Fewer safety-net hospitals were system-affiliated and fewer had high-
severity patients relative to non-safety-net hospitals. Safety-net hospitals had
lower operating and total margins relative to non-safety-net hospitals (2.9
percent and 2.5 percent vs. 1.1 percent and 4.4 percent, respectively) and
lower revenues per adjusted patient day. No statistically significant differences
were found in expenses per adjusted patient day. Finally, relative to non-saf-
ety-net hospitals, safety-net hospitals appeared to operate in slightly less
competitive markets, and in areas where household incomes were lower and
unemployment was higher.
Figure 1 displays descriptive data on the percentage of Medicaid and
uninsured patients, operating margin, and total margin for safety-net versus
non-safety-net hospitals in each year over the period 2007 through 2011. As
expected, safety-net hospitals saw moreMedicaid and uninsured patients than
non-safety-net hospitals. Operating margin was lower in all years for safety-
net hospitals relative to non-safety-net hospitals, and the difference appeared
to remain relatively consistent over time. A similar pattern was seen for total
margin, although the difference between safety-net and non-safety-net hospi-
tals disappeared in 2008 before reappearing in 2009.
Table 2 reports the effects of safety-net status, as defined using patients
in 2007, on hospital operating and total margins over time, controlling for hos-
pital and market characteristics. On average, operating margin was 4.3 per-
cent points lower and total margin 3.1 percent points lower in safety-net
hospitals relative to non-safety-net hospitals, and the differences were statisti-
cally significant. Hospital operating margins remained stable throughout the
recession, as did the difference in operating margin between safety-net and
non-safety-net hospitals. In contrast, hospital total margins, on average, fell by
3 percentage points in 2008, the first year of the recession, and then
rebounded by 2.3 percentage points in 2009, 2.8 percentage points in 2010,
and 1.4 percentage points in 2011. In 2008, the difference in total margin
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Figure 1: Patient Mix and Financial Performance in Safety-Net and Non-
Safety-Net Hospitals, 2007–2011
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between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals disappeared (i.e., was no
longer statistically significant) before returning to pre-recession levels in 2009.
System affiliation was associated with both higher operating and total margins
(4.6 and 2.7 percent points, respectively), and the results were statistically sig-
nificant. A greater percentage of high-severity patients was associated with
lower operating and total margins, although the magnitude of the effects was
small. HMO penetration was associated with lower operating margin, but it
had no statistically significant association with total margin.
Table 3 presents the association of safety-net intensity in each year of the
recession with operating and total margins, operating and total revenues per
adjusted patient day, and operating and total expenses per adjusted patient
day. The results are presented separately for privately owned hospitals versus
publicly owned hospitals. Among privately owned hospitals, for both operat-
ing and total margins, a 10 percentage point increase in safety-net intensity
was associated with a decrease in margin of approximately 1 percentage point.
As in the previous model, the effect of safety-net intensity on total margin dis-
appeared in 2008.
Table 2: Regression Results on Financial Margins in Relation to Safety-Net
Status
Coefficient (SE)
Operating Margin Total Margin
Safety-net status† 0.0430 (0.0071)*** 0.0308 (0.0052)***
Year 2008 0.0014 (0.0027) 0.0300 (0.0028)***
Year 2009 0.0078 (0.0052) 0.0234 (0.0046)***
Year 2010 0.0079 (0.0057) 0.0277 (0.0049)***
Year 2011 0.0068 (0.0054) 0.0138 (0.0046)**
Safety-net 9 2008 0.0072 (0.0043) 0.0264 (0.0043)***
Safety-net 9 2009 0.0042 (0.0057) 0.0017 (0.0047)
Safety-net 9 2010 0.0110 (0.0059) 0.0091 (0.0047)
Safety-net 9 2011 0.0000 (0.0065) 0.0097 (0.0052)
System affiliation 0.0460 (0.0044)*** 0.0274 (0.0030)***
High-severity patients 0.0006 (0.0003)* 0.0009 (0.0002)***
Outpatient visits (log) 0.0043 (0.0024) 0.0003 (0.0018)
Hospital concentration (abovemedian) 0.0080 (0.0051) 0.0025 (0.0039)
HMOpenetration (log) 0.0118 (0.0033)*** 0.0046 (0.0026)
Median household income 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Unemployment rate (log) 0.0080 (0.0068) 0.0102 (0.0059)
†Safety-net hospitals were defined as those that had the percentage of Medicaid and uninsured
patients falling within the top quartile of this measure in 2007.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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For publicly owned hospitals, safety-net intensity was negatively associ-
ated with operating and total margins and the effect sizes were larger than for
private hospitals. Among public hospitals, a 10 percentage point increase in
safety-net intensity was associated with a 2.8 percentage point decrease in
operating margin and 1.8 percentage point decrease in total margin. There
were no apparent effects of safety-net intensity on operating or total margins
during the recession; however, in 2010, the effect of safety-net intensity on
operating and total margins diminished relative to 2007.
Among private hospitals, increasing safety-net intensity appeared to
reduce both operating and total revenues per adjusted patient day. A 10 per-
centage point increase in safety-net intensity was associated with a 1.8 percent
decrease [[100*(exp(0.2013)  1)]*0.10] in operating revenue and a 1.7 per-
cent decrease in total revenue. There were no statistically significant effects of
safety-net intensity on revenue during the recession, nor were there any statis-
tically significant effects for either operating or total expenses.


















0.0946*** 0.0990*** 0.2013*** 0.1921*** 0.1009 0.0809
9 Year 2008 0.0097 0.0705*** 0.0183 0.0523 0.0007 0.0250
9 Year 2009 0.0197 0.0121 0.0267 0.0203 0.0125 0.0024
9 Year 2010 0.0018 0.0024 0.0584 0.0603 0.0503 0.0705




0.2753*** 0.1820*** 0.1535 0.0403 0.0967 0.1533
9 Year 2008 0.0035 0.0407 0.0139 0.0251 0.0216 0.0041
9 Year 2009 0.0982 0.0775 0.0384 0.0181 0.0444 0.0533
9 Year 2010 0.1565** 0.1250*** 0.0164 0.0352 0.0609 0.0482
9 Year 2011 0.0174 0.0214 0.1778* 0.1672* 0.1706** 0.1525*
†Each model includes the following control variables: system affiliation, percentage of high-sever-
ity patients, outpatient visits (log), hospital concentration (abovemedian), HMOpenetration (log),
median household income, unemployment rate (log), yearly dummies, and significant interaction
terms (p < .05) of ownership with these variables.
‡Safety-net intensity was measured as the percentage ofMedicaid and uninsured patients.
§Revenues and expenses were measured as per adjusted patient day, and logarithm was taken for
bothmeasures.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Among public hospitals, safety-net intensity was not associated with rev-
enues or expenses until 2011, when increasing safety-net intensity led to a
reduction in both. In 2011, a 10 percentage point increase in safety-net inten-
sity was associated with reductions in operating and total revenues of 1.6 and
1.5 percent, respectively, and reductions in operating and total expenses of 1.6
and 1.4 percent, respectively.
DISCUSSION
In contrast to our expectations, the recession did not appear to have a dispro-
portionate negative effect on the financial performance of safety-net hospitals
relative to non-safety-net hospitals. Hospitals serving greater proportions of
Medicaid and uninsured patients were shown to have lower operating and
total margins than non-safety-net hospitals; however, the differences between
safety-net hospitals and their peers remained relatively constant throughout
the recession. This was true for both privately owned and publicly owned
hospitals.
These findings are consistent with a recent study that found both operat-
ing and total margins to be significantly lower for safety-net hospitals, and the
gap in operating margin between safety-net and non-safety-net nonprofit hos-
pitals to be relatively stable during the recession, although operating margins
in 2008 declined more for nonprofit than for-profit hospitals (Bazzoli, Fareed,
andWaters 2014). Our results are also consistent with findings from the Center
for Studying Health Systems Change that suggested the effects of the recession
on local safety-nets were not as severe as predicted among five communities
participating in the study (Felland et al. 2010). The authors found that safety-
net hospitals may have been prepared for some of the effects of the recession,
as demand for their services had been increasing prior to the recession. More-
over, federal stimulus moneymay have lessened some of the effects of eroding
state and local budgets (Felland et al. 2010; Bazzoli, Fareed, andWaters 2014).
Notably,total margin was more negatively affected by the onset of the
recession in non-safety-net hospitals than in safety-net hospitals. This was also
true for the safety-net hospitals in Bazzoli, Fareed, and Waters (2014) relative
to the other nonprofit hospitals they studied; however, their study showed that
the smallest effect on total margin was among for-profit hospitals. While this
result was not hypothesized in advance, it is plausible, given the large invest-
ment portfolios held bymany private, not-for-profit hospitals (Song and Reiter
2010). The credit crisis and recession in 2008 had a substantial negative impact
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on financial markets, and therefore, the investment portfolios of many hospi-
tals and health systems (McCue 2010). As total margin includes the effects of
income from earnings on financial investments, this ratio reflects the volatility
in the financial markets. Examination of the ratio of long-term investments to
total assets in the safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals in our sample
revealed higher proportions of financial investments in the asset mix of non-
safety-net hospitals, and the differences were statistically significant in all years
(results not shown).
This study contributes to the emerging evidence on the effects of the
recession on safety-net hospitals nationally. Specifically, it complements the
most recent study by Bazzoli, Fareed, andWaters (2014) in several ways. First,
this study used a different definition of safety-net hospitals that included both
Medicaid and uninsured patients as identified using hospital discharge data,
thus providing a more comprehensive measure. Second, this study examined
the relationship between the annual percentage of Medicaid and uninsured
patients and operating and total margins in public versus privately owned hos-
pitals. Finally, this study decomposed and evaluated the components of the
profit ratios to determine whether there were differential effects on revenues
versus expenses.
There are, however, several important limitations that should be consid-
ered. First, our definition of safety-net hospital in our first model was based on
the top quartile of our measure of safety-net status. There are, admittedly,
alternative cutoffs that could be used to define safety-net hospitals; moreover,
regardless of cutoff, there may be variation among hospitals falling within the
safety-net classification. However, results of our analysis using continuous,
annual measures of safety-net intensity were consistent with the findings using
identification at baseline. Second, while we attempted to control for differ-
ences between safety-net and non-safety-net hospitals, safety-net status is not
randomly assigned. Thus, it is possible there are unobserved differences that
may have affected our results.
While our findings revealed that safety-net hospitals did not necessarily
fare worse than their peers during the recession, these results may not neces-
sarily be predictive of the future. Felland et al. (2010) noted that safety-net hos-
pitals may not have felt the full effects of the recession by its end in 2009. Kane
et al. (2012) echoed this caution, noting that safety-hospitals are likely to face
more competition and increasing fiscal austerity in the future. Results from
our study are suggestive of increasing financial pressure after the recession,
particularly among public hospitals. While there was no association of safety-
net status with either revenues or expenses among public hospitals during the
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recession, in 2011, increasing safety-net intensity was associated with both
lower revenues and lower expenses in these hospitals. A report by the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities found that spending cuts by states may have
been greater in 2011 than those made during the recession, although not all of
the cuts were to health services. The report also noted that by the end of 2011,
most federal stimulus funds were exhausted ( Johnson, Oliff, and Williams
2011). The National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems con-
firmed that while states nationwide made a total of almost $2 billion in cuts to
Medicaid spending for fiscal year (FY) 2010, many states proposed additional
and even greater cuts for FY2011-2012 (National Association of Public Hospi-
tals and Health Systems 2011a).
The significantly lower operating and total margins among safety-net
hospitals as compared to other hospitals suggest that these providers have less
financial cushion to weather sustained financial pressure that is not accompa-
nied by stop-gap funding such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act. Recent evidence suggests that new reimbursement models and proposed
cuts to safety-net subsidies such as disproportionate share funding under
health reform may widen the gap between safety-net and non-safety-net pro-
viders (Mohan et al. 2013; Bazzoli and Clement 2014; Neuhausen et al. 2014),
and between hospitals considered financially weak versus strong (Bazzoli,
Fareed, and Waters 2014). Future studies should continue to track the
performance of safety-net hospitals as the environment changes.
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